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Abstract
When talking about absence, we may express it in a negative statement (using explicit
negation e.g. I was not) or in a positive statement (using implicit negation e.g. I wished I
were). Previous research has shown that explicitly negated statements may cause false
recall–negated items may paradoxically be remembered as present. The current study com-
pares false recall caused by implicit and explicit negation. Participants listened to a record-
ing in which some objects were mentioned as present, some as absent, and some not
mentioned at all. The absence of objects was expressed using explicit or implicit negation.
Participants’ recall of the recording was measured either five minutes or one week after
exposure to the recording. Results indicate that implicit and explicit negation lead to a nearly
identical false recall of negated items. However, items not mentioned in the recording (i.e.
neither mentioned nor negated) were more often recognized as present by participants
exposed to implicit, rather than explicit negation. We postulate that false recall of negated
items could be explained by participants remembering the item itself, but forgetting the con-
text in which it was present (an affirmative or a negative statement), hence objects would be
recalled as present just because they were spoken of.
Introduction
In everyday communication, one of the main functions of negation is to inform about the
absence of objects (e.g. There is no fireplace in the living room), as well as to deny events (e.g.
Yesterday, the last flight fromWashington was not late) and behavior (e.g. John did not stop at a
red light). How negation influences the memory of negated objects or behavior is of interest
both from a scientific (e.g. memory and language theories) and practical standpoint (e.g.
forensic psychology). Many psycholinguistic studies have found that negatives are harder to
process than affirmatives [1, 2, 3] Negative statements impede memory (e.g. [4]) and can have
unintended, paradoxical effects for the recipients of the communication [5, 6, 7]. Results of
many previous studies (e.g. [4, 8, 9]) showed that people remember affirmative sentences bet-
ter than negative ones. The research question investigated in a paper by Maciuszek & Polczyk
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[10] was whether recalling negated objects and actions can have adverse effects on memory,
namely result in a higher rate of false recognition as compared to when the items are not men-
tioned at all. The aforementioned study [10] demonstrated that after a one-week delay, negated
items (i.e. items that the source material stated were not present) were more often reported as
‘Present’ than items not mentioned at all. These results were similar when objects and actions
were negated.
The present research aims to test whether the aforementioned higher rate of false recall is
caused directly by the cognitive processing of an explicitly negative sentence (i.e. using the
words no, not, absent, etc.), or is it possible to cause said false memories using other grammati-
cal constructs to convey negation.
In order to investigate the above question, we decided to use implicit negation to inform
participants about the absence of objects within affirmative sentences. With implicit negation,
objects or actions are not directly denied, but rather their absence needs to be inferred from the
statement (i.e. it is an implication of the sentence–as a presupposition or implicature, rather
than the sentence’s entailment). For example, such implicitly negative statements may describe
causes or consequences of the object or behavior not being present, without directly stating its
absence. It should be noted that there are very few studies on implicit negation in psychology or
linguistics, and we failed to find any research on it in the context of memory. This paper com-
pares the memory effects of explicit and implicit negation. We investigate whether the false
recall of negated items is to be explained by the cognitive processing of explicitly negative state-
ments using the words no, not, none, absent, etc., or are other explanations required.
Previous studies on memory of negated versus not mentioned objects
In a previous study [10] it was tested whether negating the presence of an object or behavior
may lead to incorrect recall that the negated object was actually present or that the negated
behavior actually did occur. The authors call this effect “negation related false memories”
(NRFM). The presence of NRFM was tested by exposing participants to an audio description
of a newly-bought house (or in another experiment—an audio description of the actions taken
by a person driving a car) in which some objects (or actions) were mentioned, some were
negated, and others were not mentioned at all (i.e. did not appear in the description). Thus,
the materials to be remembered in Experiments 1 and 2 of the aforementioned study pertained
to a static description of a house, whereas the materials to be remembered in Experiment 3
were related to human behavior—driving a car (either following or breaking various rules of
the Highway Code by the driver). A memory recognition test was performed either five min-
utes after the presentation of the description or one week later. In the short-delay condition
(five minutes) the difference in recall between items which were negated and not mentioned
was not significant. After a week, negated items (i.e. items which the source stated were absent)
were recognized as present more often than items which were not mentioned in the source at
all. This effect was replicated in all three experiments. Moreover, in experiment 2 and 3 the dif-
ference in the number of false recognitions of negated items was not statistically different from
the number of correct recognitions of items described as present in the source.
The authors explained the results by referring to the cognitive processing of negative state-
ments, such as the increased cognitive load and difficulty of processing negation, the dissocia-
tion of the negation tag, and paradoxical activation of mental representations of the negated
ideas. They assumed that results should be discussed in terms of the retention hypothesis [11]
or based on the two-step simulation hypothesis of negation [12].
The idea behind the present study was to investigate whether the NRFM effect is associated
with a different memory mechanism than processing explicit negation. For example, one may
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assume that it is easier to remember the name or label of the object present in a statement than
the syntax of the sentence (negative or affirmative). It is natural that the information that
something was missing or absent usually appears in negated sentences (e.g. There was no fire-
place in the house). Absence of objects can however be stated using affirmative sentences (e.g. I
wish there were a fireplace in the house). This is a case of implicit negation. The research ques-
tion was whether such implicit negation has a different impact on memory than explicitly
negated sentences.
Implicit and explicit negation
There are many different ways to express negation (see [13]). Clark [14] presented the general
distinction between asserted and non-asserted negation. The first type is called explicit nega-
tion and the second—implicit negation (see [15]).
It is clear that no, not, never etc. constitute explicit negation. It also includes (in English)
such expressions as scarcely, hardly, few, seldom, little, only (see [15]). Implicit negation is con-
veyed by words such as forget, fail, doubt [15], see also [16]) and is constituted by pragmatic
inferences. As noted by Xiang et al. [15] this distinction between the two types of negation is
based on the source of the negative meaning: If negation is expressed as part of the asserted
meaning of an utterance, i.e., if it is an entailment, it is explicit negation; if it belongs to the non-
asserted meaning (i.e., presupposition or implicature), it is implicit negation. (p. 72). For exam-
ple, predicates such as be surprised, be disappointed trigger negative inferences. When one says
that they are surprised, we know that something does not conform to their expectations. The
utterance I am disappointed means that a certain fact is not in coherence with one’s hopes. I
am disappointed by the quality of the item implicitly negates the item’s (good) quality. While
these examples use emotive predicates to convey implicit negation, it can be expressed in other
ways (presented later in this paper).
It should be noted that existing studies on the processing of negation have focused on
explicit negation, especially sentential negation (using the word not) and as noted by Xiang
et al. ([15], p. 72), we know relatively little about how other types of negation are processed.
There are few studies on the processing of implicit negation. It is known that the processing
of sentences containing negation is more difficult than of affirmative sentences, regardless of
whether the negatives are explicit (e.g. not) or implicit (e.g. forget) [17, 18]. Sentences become
increasingly difficult to process with each instance of (explicit or implicit) negation they con-
tain, potentially causing cognitive overload [19]. There are studies on the role of implicit and
explicit negation in the conditional reasoning bias [20]. In their study on the influences of nega-
tion and situational presence on the accessibility of text information, Kaup and Zwaan [21]
used explicit and implicit negation to inform about the absence of a certain color. The accessi-
bility of the color term was measured by means of a probe-recognition task after the end of the
sentence either with a 500 ms or 1500 ms delay. One result which we find especially relevant to
our study is that the accessibility of the word-probes (color terms) was similar for implicit and
explicit negation (i.e. affirmative absent vs. negative absent). Recent research also includes a
study on comprehension of implicit negation measured using ERP (event related potential)
[15]. Negative inference (implicit negation) in this study was triggered by “emotive” predicates,
e.g. be amazed, be surprised, be disappointed. To sum up, Xiang et al. [15] define implicit nega-
tion as presupposed or conventionally implicated–it is non-asserted and is not a sentence’s
entailment. Kaup et al. [12] describe affirmative sentences which inform about the absence of
objects as affirmative absents or implicit negatives. Following in their footsteps we define implicit
negation as conveyed through the non-asserted, pragmatic negative meaning–inferences
beyond entailments, especially as presuppositions and implicatures of the sentences [15].
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Present study
The main problem to be investigated within the presented research was whether the NRFM
effect (a significantly higher number of falsely recalled negated items than falsely recalled not
mentioned items) after a one-week delay is induced strictly by explicit negation, or whether
implicit negation may lead to the same effect, and therefore whether cognitive processing of
explicit negation is an adequate explanation of this effect.
It is possible that implicit negation requires a deeper level of cognitive processing as com-
pared to explicit negation–which facilitates better retention [22]. Understanding a sentence
such as I wish there were a fireplace in the house (implicit negation) not only requires deeper
processing than there is no fireplace in the house (explicit negation), but may also create better
contextual cues by referring to the narrator, their thoughts and emotions, and facilitate encod-
ing specificity [23]. Should this be the case, implicit negation would lead to a lower number of
negated items falsely recalled as ‘present’.
The more complex nature of sentences containing implicit negation may, however, cause
additional cognitive load required to understand their meaning. As the source used in the pre-
sented and previous research concerning NRFM was auditory and therefore time-sensitive,
the participants may not have had sufficient cognitive capabilities left to fully process and
remember all of the sentences. This would lead to an increased number of negated items falsely
recalled as ‘present’ when compared to explicit negation, as well as an increased number of
falsely recalled ‘not mentioned’ items (due to guessing and confabulation, as participants
would be aware that they did not remember all of the details).
A combination of these effects (deeper cognitive processing and increased load) may lead
to a lack of difference in the number of falsely recalled explicitly and implicitly negated items,
with an increased number of not mentioned items in the implicit negation treatment.
It is also possible that implicit and explicit negation do not vary in either the depth of cognitive
processing or cognitive load, which would lead to a lack of differences between the explicit and
implicit negation treatments. Kaup et al. [21] found some similarities in cognitive load between
implicit and explicit negation, making this a possible hypothesis. However, their research did not
investigate memory or recall, so no strong assumptions about NRFM can be drawn from it.
As one of our main hypotheses concerns a lack of differences between treatments, the insuf-
ficient standard NHST statistical tests will be supplemented by calculating Bayesian probabilities
of the null and alternative hypotheses for the no-difference effect, as presented by Masson [24].
Materials and methods
Participants
One-hundred and eighty psychology students voluntarily took part in the experiment. Four-
teen participants were excluded from the analyses because they did not attend the second part
of the procedure (eight cases) or filled out the answer sheet incorrectly (four cases). The final
sample consisted of 168 participants (139 female, 28 male, one person did not indicate their
gender; Mage = 21.61 years, SD = 2.17). Jagiellonian University Institute of Applied Psychology
Ethics Committee approved the research on human participants presented in this manuscript.
Participation was voluntary and verbal consent was obtained prior to the experimental session.
Participants did not receive remuneration.
Materials
Audio recording. We used an audio recording in which the narrator talks about their
newly bought house. The description included objects present in the house, as well as items
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PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215283 April 12, 2019 4 / 12
which were absent. The absence of objects was presented in two different ways–in the Explicit
Negation version, the narrator used explicit negation to inform about the absence of items
(e.g. ‘There are no chairs in the house’), while in the Implicit Negation treatment absence of
items was expressed using implicit negation. We used two main types of sentences to convey
implicit negation: (1) prospective action to be undertaken by the protagonist (e.g. I plan to add
a fireplace or There are windows but I need to buy curtains) and (2) expressions of disparity
between the current and preferred state (e.g. However, I would prefer if there were a playroom
or I expected there to be a shower). Implicit negation was derived as an implicature of the state-
ments, based on their context. We purposefully avoided strong emotive predicates (such as I
was furious I have to install the shower myself), in order to avoid adding emotional recall cues
to implicit negation statements while their explicit counterparts are not emotionally loaded.
Below are the particular sentences we used to convey implicit negation (implicitly negated
[objects] were counterbalanced, and [rooms] changed to reflect everyday language, e.g. not
having a [shower] installed in a [kitchen]): (1) However, I expected there to be [object], (2) The
[room] would look better if there were [object], (3) The house has [mentioned object] and in the
future I am going to have [object] built/added, (4) I still need to buy [object] to my [room], (5) I
still need to have [object] installed, and (6) It would be better if there were a(an) [object]. In each
variant of the recording, there were six items the presence of which was mentioned, six negated
items and six items which were not mentioned at all, neither as present nor absent (but were
mentioned in other versions of the recording). For counterbalancing purposes, we created
twelve versions of the description, so that each item could appear in a different condition
(present vs. absent vs. not mentioned) and in both types of negation (explicit vs. implicit). The
recordings consisted of 164–174 words and lasted around 2 minutes ± 8 seconds. Due to lon-
ger wording required for implicit negation, the Implicit Negation recordings were on average
5 seconds (or 2,5%) longer than Explicit Negation. Word count was identical (average of 170
vs 171 words for Implicit and Explicit Negation, respectively).
Memory test. The participants were given a memory recognition test based on the con-
tent of the audio recording. It was a paper-and-pencil task in which the participants were
asked to match each of the 18 listed items to one of two categories: Present or Not present in
the recording describing the house. Participants were instructed to only mark an object as
‘Present’ if it was explicitly stated in the recording. Depending on the version of the recording,
each item might have appeared as present, negated (explicitly or implicitly) or not mentioned.
However, in each case six items from the list were present in the building and 12 object were
not present. The absence of six of these items was mentioned in the description, while the
remaining six objects were not mentioned at all. The memory test measured the number of
items classified as Present in three categories: correct recognitions of Present Mentioned items,
incorrect (false) recognitions of Present Negated items, and incorrect (false) recognitions of
Present Not Mentioned items. While ostensibly the comparison was between raw numbers of
Present answers, they were a measure of correct recall of Mentioned items and a measure of
false recall of Negated and Not Mentioned items.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab. Participants attended the experiment in
groups of 6 to 10. Each individual was randomly assigned to one of two conditions (explicit
negation vs. implicit negation) and one version of the recording. Participants were instructed
to carefully listen to the recording and to write down a nickname and the filename (number)
of the recording they were assigned to (in order to match the version of the recording with the
answer sheet). Subsequently, participants were given a filler task (unrelated to the recording)
Implicit negation causes false recall just as well as explicit negation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215283 April 12, 2019 5 / 12
which lasted about 5 minutes. In the Short Delay treatment, participants were then given the
memory test. Individuals in the Long Delay condition were released after the filler task, not
informed that the experiment would continue at a later date. In this condition, participants
received the memory test one week later, on short notice. All participants were also asked to
sign the tests with their nickname and the recording number, so that we could match the ver-
sion of the description with the memory test.
Experimental design
The design included two between-subject factors: type of negation (Explicit/Implicit) and
delay (5 minutes/1 week). Moreover, there was a within-subject factor: the type of information
(items being mentioned, negated or not mentioned). Therefore, a mixed counterbalanced
2x2x3 design was used.
Results
Implicit vs explicit negation and false recall of negated items
Analyses were conducted using ANOVA. The most important result was that Type of Nega-
tion did not significantly influence the number of Negated items (incorrectly) classified as
‘Present’ (M = 1.96, SD = .12 for Implicit Negation and M = 1.90, SD = .13 for Explicit Nega-
tion, F(1,164) = .124; p = .726; η2p = .001). As this finding is a nonsignificant effect, Bayesian
probabilities for the null and alternative hypothesis were calculated (based on [24]), yielding
p(H0|D) = .924 and a p(H1|D) = .076, meaning that the Bayesian probability that Implicit vs
Explicit Negation influences the number of ‘Present’ answers to Negated items was 7.6%. This
effect was neither significant in the 5 minute delay treatment (M = 1.05, SD = .18 for Implicit
Negation, M = .88, SD = .18 for Explicit Negation; p = .497; η2p = .003; p(H0|D) = .873, p(H1|
D) = .127) nor in the one week delay treatment (M = 2.88, SD = .17 for Implicit Negation,
M = 2.93, SD = .18 for Explicit Negation; p = .839; η2p< .001; p(H0|D) = .902, p(H1|D) = .098).
Negation-related false memories (NRFM)
Analyses were conducted using within-subjects GLM, all pairwise comparisons calculated with
Bonferroni correction. The type of information regarding items (Mentioned, Negated or Not
Mentioned) significantly influenced the number of items classified as ‘Present’ in the recording
(F(2,334) = 124.982; p< .001; η2p = .428). The number of (correct) ‘Present’ answers to Men-
tioned items was the highest (M = 4.20; SD = 1.34) and significantly higher than the number of
(incorrect) ‘Present’ answers to Negated and Not Mentioned items (both p< .001). The difference
between Negated (M = 1.98; SD = 1.50) and Not Mentioned (M = 1.99; SD = 1.39) was nonsignifi-
cant (p> .99). Pairwise comparisons of expected marginal means for Negated and Not Men-
tioned items in the 5 minute and one-week delay treatments revealed that the difference in the
number of ‘Present’ answers to Negated and Not Mentioned items was significant for Implicit
Negation after the 5 minute delay (M = 1.05, SD = .18 for Negated items, M = 1.88, SD = .21 for
Not Mentioned items; p = .003) and for Explicit Negation after the one-week delay (M = 2.93, SD
= .18 for Negated items and M = 2.15, SD = .21 for Not Mentioned items, p = .005).
Negation effects vs. random chance answers
Analyses were conducted using one-sample t-tests. The number of ‘Present’ answers to
Negated items after the one week delay was not significantly different from 50% random
chance (t(87) = -.803; p = .424), while for the 5-minute delay it was significantly lower (t(79) =
-16.807; p< .001). The number of ‘Present’ answers to Not Mentioned items was significantly
Implicit negation causes false recall just as well as explicit negation
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lower from random chance both after a one week delay (t(87) = -4.993, p< .001) and after a
5-minute delay (t(87) = -8.528, p< .001). Means, SDs and 95% CIs for ‘Present’ answers across
Type of Information, Negation Type and Delay are presented in Table 1. The mean numbers
of ‘Present’ answers across types of information and treatments (delay and negation type) are
presented in Fig 1.
Impact of negation type on recognition of Not Mentioned items
Further investigation into the numbers of (incorrect) ‘Present’ answers to Negated and Not
Mentioned items dependent on Negation Type and Delay demonstrated that in the Implicit
Table 1. Expected marginal means for ‘Present’ answers across information types and treatments.
Delay Negation Type Type of information M SD 95% CI
1 week Implicit Mentioned 3.65 1.14 3.309 3.982
Negated 2.88 1.28 2.548 3.202
Not Mentioned 2.54 1.15 2.164 2.919
Explicit Mentioned 3.53 1.30 3.156 3.894
Negated 2.93 1.10 2.566 3.284
Not Mentioned 2.15 1.23 1.736 2.564
5 minutes Implicit Mentioned 4.83 1.06 4.456 5.194
Negated 1.05 1.28 .691 1.409
Not Mentioned 1.88 1.42 1.461 2.289
Explicit Mentioned 4.95 1.22 4.581 5.319
Negated .88 .85 .516 1.234
Not Mentioned 1.30 1.51 .886 1.714
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215283.t001
Fig 1. Mean numbers of ‘Present’ answers across information types and treatments.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215283.g001
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Negation treatment, there was a higher number of ‘Present’ answers to Not Mentioned items
than in the Explicit Negation group. The difference was statistically significant with Delay
excluded: F(1, 167) = 5.62; p = 0.02; M = 2.24, SD = 1.31 for Implicit Negation; M = 1.73,
SD = 1.43 for Explicit Negation.
Predictably, the number of ‘Present’ answers to Mentioned items was significantly higher
for the 5 minute than for the 1 week delay (M = 4.89; SD = 1.14 vs M = 3.59; SD = 1.21; p<
.001), the number of ‘Present’ answers to Negated items was higher for the 1 week than the 5
minute delay (M = 2.90; SD = 1.19 vs M = .96; SD = 1.08; p< .001), and the number of ‘Pres-
ent’ answers to Not mentioned items was higher for the 1 week than the 5 minute delay
(M = 2.36; SD = 1.20 vs M = 1.59; SD = 1.48; p< .001).
Discussion
The presented study is a continuation of earlier research by Maciuszek & Polczyk [10], in
which the NRFM (Negation Related False Memories) effect was shown. NRFM led to a signifi-
cantly higher number of false alarms regarding negated than not mentioned items (after a one-
week delay). This finding raised a question whether the NRFM effect is to be explained by cog-
nitive processing of explicit negation (i.e. negative statements) or whether it can be accounted
for within a broader theoretical scope. It is possible that recalling an item mentioned in a given
source is easier than recalling whether the item was mentioned within an affirmative or nega-
tive statement (especially after a weeklong delay). In other words, it may be easier to recall
individual words within statements than the syntactic structure of these statements.
On the one hand, the presented research served as a replication of the NRFM effect using
explicit negation. More importantly, however, we tested whether the NRFM effect can be
reproduced when negation is expressed in affirmative statements–implicitly. We wanted to
investigate the consequences of implicit negation on memory of negated items. Our predic-
tions were based on the assumption that implicit negation is different from explicit negation in
the following ways:
1. Implicit negation may require deeper cognitive processing in order to derive meaning,
which could cause better memory retention,
2. It may lead to a higher level of cognitive load (in order to derive meaning), which coupled
with a time-critical nature of understanding auditory material would be detrimental to
memorizing,
The two above effects could coincide, leading to a similar quality of recall for explicit and
implicit negation.
Results can be summarized in four key points. Firstly, results of the previous research on
NRFM were replicated: with short delay there were no significant differences between the
number of falsely recalled negated and not mentioned items. However, after a one-week delay
the number of falsely recalled explicitly negated items was significantly higher than the num-
ber of falsely recalled not mentioned items. Secondly, there were no differences in false recall
between implicit and explicit negation, both after a short and a long delay. There is statistical
evidence that not only were the differences insignificant, but the probability that the effects are
present is very low. Thirdly, an interesting relation between the type of negation (implicit vs
explicit) and recall of not mentioned items was detected. In the Implicit Negation treatment,
there was a higher number of falsely recalled not mentioned items than in the Explicit Nega-
tion group. After a five-minute delay, the number of falsely recalled not mentioned items was
higher for Implicit Negation than for Explicit Negation. After a one-week delay the effect was
not significant, but still the number of falsely recalled not mentioned items was higher for
Implicit negation causes false recall just as well as explicit negation
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Implicit than Explicit negation, leading to NRFM being absent in the Implicit Negation one-
week delay treatment (caused by a high number of falsely recalled not mentioned items, rather
than a low number of falsely recalled negated items; the number of falsely recalled negated
items in the two groups was virtually identical). Finally, the most predictable result (but still
worth mentioning) was the influence of delay on false recall: the longer delay led to an
increased number of falsely recalled items, both implicitly/explicitly negated and not men-
tioned. Conversely, the number of correctly recalled mentioned items was lower after the one-
week delay than after 5 minutes.
There is very little empirical evidence on the cognitive processing of implicit negation. We
are not aware of any research concerning the influence of implicit negation on memory, and
particularly comparing the effects of explicit and implicit negation on memory performance.
The presented study demonstrated that informing about the absence of items by means of
implicit negation yields similar, if not identical results as explicit negation: it led to a similar
level of false recall (i.e. recognition of negated items as present in the description).
Kaup & Zwaan [21] used explicit and implicit negation to state the absence of items.
Although their research investigated the short-term accessibility of text information rather
than memory processes, it provides a comparison of explicit and implicit negation. Partici-
pants were presented with narratives, the penultimate sentence of which contained a color
term and stated the presence or absence of said color within a context. The absence of the
color was stated via a negative (explicit negation) or an affirmative statement (implicit nega-
tion)–e.g. Susan liked the bike, she was glad that it did not have a blue frame (negative/absent)
or Susan liked the bike, she only wished that it had a blue frame (affirmative/absent). The acces-
sibility of the color term was measured by means of a probe-recognition task either 500 ms or
1500 ms after participants had read the sentence mentioning the color term. After a 1500 ms
delay, the participants’ reaction time to the probe-recognition task was longer when the color
was stated as absent in the description, and shorter when the color was stated as present. It
means that after a certain point in the comprehension process, concepts which are present in
the state of affairs are more available than concepts absent from this state of affairs. Important
for the present study, however, is that the response times were similar for explicit and implicit
negation both after a 500ms and a 1500ms delay. It means that the accessibility of negated text
information was independent from the type of negation. Additionally, the authors analyzed
reading times (i.e. amount of time required to read) of the target sentences. The type of nega-
tion (explicit and implicit) did not have any significant influence on reading times. It can be
inferred that the affirmative absent (implicit negation) was similarly difficult to process as the
negative absent (explicit negation) condition.
The above study concerned the short-time impact of negation and immediate, transient
representations based on it. Our study addresses the long-term impact of negation on memory
performance. Neither of these studies showed a difference between explicit and implicit nega-
tion. While the processing of implicit and explicit negation in the study by Kaup & Zwaan [21]
was similar, it does not necessarily mean that the nearly identical number of falsely recalled for
explicit and implicit negation presented in our study is caused by an identical memory mecha-
nism. Indeed, results do not seem consistent with this explanation, due to the difference in the
number of Not Mentioned items incorrectly recognized as Present in the explicit and implicit
negation treatments. Were the memory mechanisms identical for these two types of negation,
such a difference would have no basis to occur. It seems that the impact of implicit and explicit
negation on memory processing may be different in at least two potential ways: implicit nega-
tion may lead to a deeper level of processing (i.e. inferring the absence of an item), and a higher
cognitive load. These two factors might counteract one another, leading to a similar level of
false recognition in both types of negation.
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The assumption that implicit negation leads to a higher cognitive load is based on the fact
that in the present study the negative sentences were relatively simple, having one negation at
most (e.g. There is no fireplace in the living room). Explicit negation is a direct, literal informa-
tion about the absence of an item, while implicit negation indirectly states the absence, requir-
ing inference. The presented study utilized an audio recording, the processing of which is
time-sensitive. In most research on negation, the information is presented as text and reading
time is a measure of the text’s difficulty. The reading time is longer for negated sentences. An
audio recording makes participants unable to control the speed at which information is fed, in
order to adjust to the difficulty of said information (whether it consists of affirmative or nega-
tive statements, as well as whether it utilizes implicit or explicit negation). Should a given state-
ment require more time to process than the recording provides, participants are forced to
begin processing the next statement while still engaged in processing the previous one. This
requires the participants to either stop processing the previous sentence before it is fully under-
stood, to delay processing the next sentence (eventually forcing them to skip content as they
are engaged in processing a previous sentence), or to process more than one sentence simulta-
neously with limited cognitive capabilities. Let us assume that this is more common for
implicit negation. Participants who were forced to process the sentences faster than they were
able to would have a worse recall of the whole description, as well as reduced trust in their
memory of the description (e.g. [25]). This would make them more prone to guessing whether
items not mentioned in the description may or may not have gone by unnoticed while they
were processing another sentence. In other words, they simply would not be sure what they
may have missed or forgotten. This would lead to an increased number of ‘Present’ answers to
Not Mentioned items for Implicit Negation than for Explicit Negation–a conclusion consistent
with our results. However, the present study does not provide direct empirical evidence to ver-
ify such an explanation, which is to be tested in future research.
The presented study confirmed the expectation that absence of items stated within affirma-
tive sentences (implicit negation) may generate a similar level of false recall as direct state-
ments of absence within negative sentences (explicit negation). The effect described in
Maciuszek & Polczyk [10] which inspired the present study–a significantly greater number of
falsely recalled negated than not mentioned items after a weeklong delay–may be explained by
it being easier to recall objects mentioned within a sentence than to remember whether said
objects were affirmed or negated. For explicit negation, this effect may be reinforced by how
negation is processed. Research on negation shows that negative sentences are more difficult
to process than affirmative sentences. Moreover, the early steps of cognitive processing cause
an activation of the negated state of affairs (see [26]). These mechanisms lead to the following
consequences for memory: (1) Affirmative sentences are remembered better than negative
sentences, and (2) a transient representation of the negated objects can activate during the
memory test, leading to false recall. Moreover, memory errors often take the form of convert-
ing negative sentences into affirmatives (e.g. Jim is not responsible might be remembered as
Jim is responsible—see [9], see also [27]. These types of errors are particularly typical for uni-
polar descriptions—a kind of description which has no well-defined opposite construct / anto-
nym (e.g. not charismatic does not clearly suggest any particular trait). A bi-polar description
has a clear opposite construct which is easily accessible (e.g. Tom is not guilty would be
encoded as Tom is innocent) [9]. Negation in our study concerns descriptions which are uni-
polar, that is, where negation does not point to a clear alternative (e.g. There was no fridge). In
this case dissociation errors (i.e. loss of the negation marker, resulting in negatives turning into
affirmatives) are likely. The present research suggests that such errors and mechanisms of cog-
nitive processing are not specific for negative statements and explicit negation, but may be elic-
ited using implicit negation as well. For example, the statement John wishes he were happy may
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be remembered as John is happy just as easily as the statement John is not happy, though both
sentences (bi-polar) state that John is indeed unhappy.
The contemporary contextual approach focuses on the importance of context on processing
negation [28,26], stating that whether processing negation is easier or more difficult depends
on the context in which negation is presented. It seems this assumption may also be relevant to
implicit negation. Future research should investigate whether context factors moderate
implicit negation processing and memory. Research on implicit and explicit negation may
provide important implications for theories of memory and language processing, and there-
fore investigating the underlying mechanisms of understanding and remembering on implicit
negation seems worthwhile.
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